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The Abolition of the Mandatory Death Penalty in India and
Bangladesh: A Comparative Commonwealth Perspective
Andrew Novak
Across the Commonwealth, the mandatory death penalty is in decline in
favor of a capital sentencing regime that delegates sentencing discretion to a trial
judge. The common law mandatory death penalty for murder simplified the
sentencing process in resource-constrained legal systems, but it was a crude tool
that papered over other deficiencies in the criminal justice system. By sweeping
in mercy killing with sadistic killing and cold-blooded murder with heat-ofpassion murder, the mandatory death penalty over-punished and led to bloated
1
death rows even as the number of executions declined across the world.
Although an executive or mercy committee could grant clemency or pardon in
2
troublesome cases, this failed to reduce all risk of arbitrariness or mistake. India
and Bangladesh are no exception to this Commonwealth-wide trend. Following
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Woodson v. North Carolina,
abolishing the mandatory death penalty for murder in 1976, which led to a
system of guided sentencing discretion in capital cases, the Supreme Court of
3
India did likewise in Mithu v. State of Punjab in 1983. Despite the Court’s
broad-based rationale in Mithu, the legislature continued to pass mandatory
capital sentencing regimes for specific-intent offenses related to terrorism, drug
4
trafficking, and caste violence. Two recent decisions of Indian courts, analyzed

* Andrew Novak is Adjunct Professor of Criminology, Law, and Society at George Mason University,
where he teaches Law and Justice Around the World. He is the author of THE GLOBAL DECLINE OF THE
MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY: CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGISLATIVE REFORM IN AFRICA,
ASIA, AND THE CARIBBEAN (2014), THE DEATH PENALTY IN AFRICA: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
(2014), and a forthcoming book, COMPARATIVE EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARDON
POWER AND THE PREROGATIVE OF MERCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (forthcoming 2015).
1. For more on the decline in the number of executions worldwide, see Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Amnesty
International Report Claims Death Penalty is Declining Worldwide, GUARDIAN (Apr. 10, 2013, 3:42 EDT),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/10/death-penalty-declining-worldwide-amnesty.
2. Rob Turrell, “It’s a Mystery”: The Royal Prerogative of Mercy in England, Canada, and South Africa,
4 CRIME, HIST. & SOCIETIES 83, 84-88 (2000).
3. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). Justice Stewart memorably wrote for the Court that
the mandatory death penalty “treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual
human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the
penalty of death.” Id. at 304. See also Mithu v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 S.C.R. 690. This article cites to the
following print reporters in India: All India Reports (A.I.R.), Supreme Court Reports (S.C.R.), and Supreme
Court Cases (S.C.C.). In Bangladesh, the following print reporters are used: Bangladesh Law Chronicles
(B.L.C.), Bangladesh Legal Decisions (B.L.D.), and Dhaka Law Reports (D.L.R.). Where no print reporter
citation is possible, citation will be made to a case or docket number including the full date and any other
identifying information.
4. See, e.g., Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, § 31A Acts of Parliament, 1985
(India); Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, No. 33, § 2(i), Acts of
Parliament, 1989; Terrorism and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, No. 28, § 3(2)(i), Acts of
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below, have invoked Mithu and determined that the mandatory death penalty
5
under these laws is constitutionally inoperable. In 2010, the High Court Division
of Bangladesh also invalidated the mandatory death penalty by relying on the
6
reasoning in Mithu.
Because most postcolonial Commonwealth constitutions contain
fundamental rights provisions that include due process rights and a prohibition on
cruel and degrading punishment, they possess uniform constitutional
7
vulnerabilities that make collateral attacks on the death penalty possible. In
addition to India and Bangladesh, human rights litigation against the mandatory
nature of the death penalty has succeeded in the establishment of discretionary
capital punishment regimes throughout the English-speaking Caribbean and in
8
the African countries of Kenya, Malawi, and Uganda. National courts across the
English-speaking world share death penalty jurisprudence, citing to one another
and contributing to a corpus of comparative case law, which has succeeded in
drastically restricting the scope of the death penalty and has created new
9
international norms of death penalty due process. The most recent contributions
to this body of transnational jurisprudence include the decisions of the Supreme
Court of India in Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab, the Bombay High Court in
Indian Harm Reduction Network (on behalf of Gulam Mohammed Malik) v.
Union of India, and the Bangladesh High Court Division in Bangladesh Legal
10
Aid and Services Trust (on behalf of Sukur Ali) v. Bangladesh. These cases align
with the global Commonwealth trend finding judicial sentencing discretion in
capital cases to be constitutionally required. While these decisions generously
cited case law from around the Commonwealth, they paid particularly close
attention to jurisprudence on the Indian Subcontinent in a regional sharing
process that mimics the global one.

Parliament, 1987 (repealed but not retroactive); Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, No. 15, § 3(2)(a), Acts of
Parliament, 2002 (repealed but not retroactive); Unlawful Activities Prevention (Amendment) Act, 2004, No.
29, § 6(b)(i), Acts of Parliament, 2004.
5. Indian Harm Reduction Network (on behalf of Gulam Mohammed Malik) v. Union of India, Crim.
Writ Petition No. 1784 of 2010 (June 11, 2010) (Bombay H.C.); State of Punjab v. Dalbir Singh, A.I.R. 2012
S.C. 1040 (India).
6. Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (on behalf of Sukur Ali) v. Bangladesh, (2010) 30 B.L.D.
194 (H.C.D.).
7. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE DEATH PENALTY AS CRUEL TREATMENT AND TORTURE: CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT CHALLENGED IN THE WORLD’S COURTS 3-4 (1996).
8. See, e.g., Reyes v. Queen, [2002] 2 A.C. 259 (P.C.)(appeal taken from Belize); Queen v. Hughes,
[2002] 2 A.C. 259 (P.C.) (appeal taken from St. Lucia); Fox v. Queen, [2002] A.C. 284 (P.C.) (appeal taken
from St. Kitts & Nevis); Kafantayeni v. A.G., [2007] M.W.H.C. 1 (Malawi H.C.); A.G. v. Kigula, [2009] 2
E.A.L.R. 1 (Uganda S.C.); Mutiso v. Republic, [2011] 1 E.A.L.R. 342 (Kenya C.A.).
9. Paolo Carozza, “My Friend is a Stranger”: The Death Penalty and the Global Ius Commune of Human
Rights, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1036 (2002).
10. Singh, A.I.R 2012 S.C. at 1040; Indian Harm Reduction Network (on behalf of Gulam Mohammed
Malik), Crim Writ Petition No. 1784 of 2010; Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (on behalf of Sukur
Ali), 30 B.L.D. at 194.
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This article will place these three recent decisions in comparative context and
trace the Indian and Bangladeshi jurisprudence back to the Indian Supreme
Court’s decision in Mithu, emphasizing the turbulent rise of judicial capital
sentencing discretion in post-mandatory death penalty regimes. Although Mithu
confirmed that judicial sentencing discretion was required in murder cases—
murder being a general-intent crime, encompassing a wide range of moral
culpability—populist legislation continued to enact mandatory death penalties for
11
aggravated specific-intent offenses. In India, these offenses included caste
violence, drug trafficking, and death by arms of war, and in Bangladesh, murder
12
of a woman or child by explosives or acid, dowry murder, and rape-murder. By
extending Mithu’s reasoning to these specific-intent offenses, the courts of India
and Bangladesh have closed the door on mandatory capital punishment and
ensured that judicial sentencing discretion in all capital cases is constitutionally
13
required.
I. THE DECLINE OF THE MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY IN THE COMMONWEALTH
The mandatory death penalty is in world-historical decline and has yielded to
capital sentencing regimes in most of the English-speaking world that allow a
judge to pass a lesser sentence based on the circumstances of the offense and the
14
offender. The abolition of mandatory capital punishment, which has had the
consequence of greatly shrinking the size of death rows and reducing an
overreliance on executive clemency mechanisms, was the deliberate intention of
15
a handful of London-based human rights lawyers. This network of lawyers
11. See Mithu v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 S.C.R. 690; see also supra, note 4 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, § 31A, Acts of Parliament (India);
Arms Act, 1959, No. 54, as amended by Arms (Amendment) Act, 1988, No. 42, § 6(3), Acts of Parliament,
1988 (India); Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, No. 33, § 2(i), Acts
of Parliament (India); Oppression of Women and Children (Special Enactment) Act, No. 18 §§4, 6(2), and 10(1)
(1995) (Bangl.).
13. By contrast, consider the ruling of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ong Ah Chuan v.
Public Prosecutor, in which the Privy Council upheld the mandatory death penalty for drug trafficking. In dicta,
the Privy Council appeared to distinguish drug trafficking from murder, noting that some crimes permitted
“considerable variation in moral blameworthiness, despite the similarity in legal guilt of offenders upon whom
the same mandatory death penalty must be passed.” For murder, often committed in the heat of passion, “the
likelihood of this is very real; it is perhaps more theoretical than real in the case of large scale trafficking in
drugs, a crime of which the motive is cold calculated greed.” Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor, [1981] A.C.
648, 673-74 (P.C. 1980) (appeal taken from Sing.). As stated below, however, the decision is no longer good
law in the Commonwealth, having been reversed by the Privy Council in a series of challenges arising from the
Caribbean.
14. See ANDREW NOVAK, THE GLOBAL DECLINE OF THE MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY:
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGISLATIVE REFORM IN AFRICA, ASIA, AND THE CARIBBEAN 6-7
(2014).
15. This strategy is driven in large part by the Death Penalty Project UK and its executive directors Saul
Lehrfreund and Parvais Jabbar, as well as UK-based pro bono attorneys and partners on the ground. Rick Lines,
Litigating Against the Death Penalty for Drug Offences: An Interview with Saul Lehrfreund and Parvais
Jabbar, 1 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. & DRUG POL’Y 53, 54-5 (2010).
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helped defend death row inmates in the Caribbean before the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council, the highest court for most English-speaking countries in the
16
Caribbean basin. Bringing challenges before the United Nations Human Rights
Committee and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, this network
of lawyers, led by the Death Penalty Project and its partners, clarified the
obligations of countries that were party to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the American Convention on Human Rights,
17
both of which restrict the death penalty to the most serious crimes. The
jurisprudence from these human rights tribunals was persuasive to the Privy
Council, which extinguished the mandatory death penalty as unconstitutional in
18
most of the Commonwealth Caribbean.
These lawyers relied on two types of challenges. First, because the
mandatory death penalty treated all murders the same, it could be too harsh for a
crime and therefore, cruel and degrading punishment. The seminal Privy Council
19
decision in Reyes v. Queen from Belize emphasized this aspect. Second,
because the mandatory death penalty did not offer a defendant a sentencing
hearing, the penalty violated the right to a fair trial, a holding recognized by the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in Edwards v. Bahamas and other
20
cases. Following the abolition of the mandatory death penalty in most of the
Commonwealth Caribbean, the London-based network of human rights lawyers
worked with allies on the ground to bring successful challenges to the mandatory
16. See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and
the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1865-7
(2002)(noting the increasingly robust human rights role played by the Privy Council and the eventual backlash
from Caribbean nations). As a result of this death penalty litigation, Barbados and Belize have adopted the
Caribbean Court of Justice as their highest court of final appeal, and other Caribbean states may do likewise.
See Margaret A. Burnham, Indigenous Constitutionalism and the Death Penalty: The Case of the
Commonwealth Caribbean, 3 INT’L J. CON. L. 582, 584-5 (2005).
17. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter, ICCPR) art. 6(2), opened for
signature December 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force March 23, 1976) (restricting the death
penalty to “the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the
crime” and “pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court”); American Convention on Human
Rights art. 4(2), opened for signature November 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S., O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 (restricting the
death penalty to “the most serious crimes and pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court and in
accordance with a law establishing such punishment”).
18. See, e.g., Thompson v. St. Vincent & Grenadines, U.N. Human Rights. Comm., Communication no.
806/1998, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/806/1998 (2000); Chan v. Guyana, U.N. Human Rights. Comm.,
Communication no. 913/2000, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/913/2000 (2006); Baptiste v. Grenada, Case 11.743,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 38/00, OEA/Ser.L.V.II.106 doc. 3 (1999); McKenzie v. Jamaica, Case
12.023, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 41/00, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.106 doc. 3 (2000). The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights also has jurisdiction for cases arising from Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, and has
found the mandatory death penalty in these countries out of compliance with the American Convention on
Human Rights. See Hilare, Constantine & Benjamin v. Trinidad & Tobago, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94 (June 21, 2002); Boyce v. Barbados, Preliminary Objection,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 169 (Nov. 20, 2007).
19. Reyes v. Queen, [2002] 2 A.C. 259, [15] (P.C.)(appeal taken from Belize).
20. Edwards v. Bahamas, Case 12.067, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 48/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111,
doc. 20 (2000).
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death penalty before the Constitutional Court of Malawi, the Supreme Court of
Uganda, and the Court of Appeal of Kenya, each of which established
discretionary death penalty regimes and ordered the resentencing of all prisoners
21
on death row. While implementation of these decisions has been slow, they
were significant victories of human rights litigation that spurred criminal justice
22
reforms, such as the adoption of new sentencing guidelines in Uganda.
However, similar challenges failed before the Supreme Court of Ghana and the
Singapore Court of Appeal. While Singapore (and Malaysia) have constitutions
that differ from the Commonwealth model—lacking a prohibition on cruel,
inhuman, and degrading punishment and a protection of the right to a fair trial—
the poorly-reasoned Ghana case rejected the emerging Commonwealth consensus
out of hand as judicially activist in a decision repudiated by the UN Human
Rights Committee as out of compliance with Ghana’s obligations under the
23
ICCPR. But even Ghana and Singapore are not immune from this emerging
trans-Commonwealth norm: in 2012, Singapore initiated a drastic curtailment of
its mandatory death penalty, including the controversial drug trafficking
provisions. Similarly, in Ghana, a death penalty moratorium is in place and the
24
current government has committed to abolition.
These “second-generation” challenges to the mandatory death penalty are not
new; the defects inherent in a mandatory death regime, including the risk of jury
nullification, where a jury refuses to convict a guilty defendant in order to avoid
25
a death sentence, have been widely known for decades. The Privy Council had
previously rejected challenges to the mandatory death penalty in cases arising
from Rhodesia and Singapore, as did the Supreme Court of Canada in a 1977

21. Kafantayeni, [2007] MW.H.C. 1 at 6-7; Kigula v. A.G., [2009] 2 E.A.L.R. 1, 17 (Uganda S.C.);
Mutiso, [2011] 1 E.A.L.R. at 342 (Kenya S.C.).
22. For the difficulties in implementing these decisions see Sandra Babcock & Ellen Wight McLaughlin,
Reconciling Human Rights and the Application of the Death Penalty in Malawi: The Unfulfilled Promise of
Kafantayeni v. Attorney General, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: NEW PERSPECTIVES 181, 195-7 (Peter Hodgkinson
ed., 2013); Graeme L. Hill, Successful Capital Litigation in Uganda: A Counterintuitive Approach?, in
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: NEW PERSPECTIVES 297, 308-9 (Peter Hodgkinson ed., 2013). For the Ugandan
sentencing guidelines, see The Constitution (Sentencing Guidelines for Courts of Judicature) (Practice)
Directions of 2013 (April 26, 2013), available at http://www.jlos.go.ug/index.php/document-centre/documentcentre/doc_download/264-sentencing-guidelines.
23. See Yong Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor, [2010] 3 S.L.R. 491 (Sing. C.A.); Dexter Johnson v.
Republic, [2011] S.C.G.L.R. 601 (Ghana); Johnson v. Ghana,U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication no.
2177/2012, UN Doc. CCPR/C/110/D/2177/2012 (March 27, 2014) (U.N.H.R.C.).
24. For Singapore, see Penal Code (Amendment) Act, 2012, No. 33; Criminal Procedure (Amendment)
Act, 2012, No. 34, §§ 12-13; Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Act, 2012, No. 27. For Ghana, see Republic of
Ghana, White Paper on the Report of the Constitution Review Commission of Inquiry, W.P. No. 1/2012, June
2012, at 44.
25. See, e.g., WALTER BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIME AND THE MORALITY OF THE DEATH
PENALTY 181 (1979)(on jury nullification); Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death
Penalty Statutes, 87 HARV. L.REV. 1690, 1712-3, 1715 (1974) (on the transfer of sentencing discretion from the
judge to prosecutors and mercy committees, increasing the risk of arbitrariness).
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26

challenge. The United States Supreme Court, however, famously ruled that a
mandatory death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
27
the Eighth Amendment. Justice Stewart elegantly stated that the punishment
treated all persons convicted of murder “not as uniquely individual human
beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the
28
blind infliction of the penalty of death.” After striking down the common law
mandatory death penalty, the Court subsequently struck down the narrower
mandatory death regimes for first-degree murder, murder of a law enforcement
officer, and finally, murder committed by a prisoner already under a sentence of
29
life imprisonment.
Like the United States, India’s constitutional abolition of the mandatory
death penalty preceded the new “second generation” challenges, invalidating the
mandatory death sentence in 1983, in Mithu v. State of Punjab, citing Woodson
30
and other cases. As a doctrinal matter, the three decisions explored below
descend from Mithu’s holding that judicial sentencing discretion in capital cases
is constitutionally required, rather than evolving directly from the “second
generation” challenges elsewhere in Africa, the Commonwealth Caribbean, and
Southeast Asia. However, the holdings of the below-discussed cases coincide
with the Commonwealth-wide trend to move away from the common law
mandatory death penalty. Despite their doctrinal reliance on Mithu, these three
decisions broadly cited and followed recent precedent from around the
Commonwealth, including the Caribbean and Africa, helping to harmonize
criminal justice regimes across borders and ensuring that the emerging human
rights norm that judicial discretion is required in capital cases is adopted in
31
domestic law.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN INDIA
No country in the world that professes to maintain a commitment to legal
capital punishment executes at a lower rate than India, about once every ten years

26. Queen v. Runyowa, [1967] R.L.R. 42 (P.C.)(appeal taken from Rhodesia & Nyasaland); Ong Ah
Chuan, A.C. at 648 (appeal taken from Sing.). While Singapore’s constitution did not have a prohibition on
cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment, Rhodesia’s did. For Canada, see Miller v. Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R.
680 (Can.). In Miller, the Court refused to follow Woodson v. North Carolina by upholding the mandatory
death penalty for the murder of a law enforcement officer, even though the legislature abolished the death
penalty the prior year. Also note that Supreme Court Reports (S.C.R.) in this footnote refers to the Canadian
series and not to the Indian series.
27. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280.
28. Id. at 304.
29. Stanislaus Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (for first-degree murder); Harry Roberts v.
Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (for intentional murder of a police officer); Sumner v. Shuman, 438 U.S. 66
(1987) (for a life-term prisoner who commits murder).
30. Mithu v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 S.C.R. 690 (India).
31. NOVAK, supra note 14, at 7.
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32

for an annual execution rate of one in more than ten billion per year. The death
penalty is publicly marginal, even though it is regularly imposed, which is the
result of an embattled criminal justice system that suffers from long delays and
33
cumbersome procedures. This is true despite India’s high homicide rate, which
is six times higher than Japan’s, three times higher than Singapore’s, and twice as
high as China’s. These are three countries with historically more active death
34
penalties than India. Currently, the death penalty is available under the Indian
Penal Code for murder, attempted murder by a life convict, abetting any capital
offense, waging war against the government, abetting mutiny, fabricating false
evidence in a capital trial, abetting the suicide of a child or insane person,
kidnapping for ransom, gang robbery involving murder, repeat conviction for
35
sexual assault, and criminal conspiracy to commit a capital crime. In addition, a
handful of organized crime and terrorism-related statutes as well as the criminal
36
codes of the armed forces authorize the death penalty. If anything, the rareness
of actual executions contributes to the underlying arbitrariness of India’s criminal
justice system. The system is “lawless in the sense that nothing about the nation’s
capital jurisprudence can explain who gets sentenced to death or hanged when
hundreds of equally or more culpable offenders escape the death penalty
37
altogether.” The two most recent executions were of Pakistani militant
Mohammed Ajmal Kasab in November 2012, the only surviving perpetrator of
the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack, and Mohammed Afzal Guru in February 2013,

32. DAVID T. JOHNSON & FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE NEXT FRONTIER: NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
POLITICAL CHANGE, AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN ASIA 438-40 (2009); for more statistics on executions in
India, see Death Penalty Worldwide: India, CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCHOOL (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.death
penaltyworldwide.org/country-search-post.cfm?country=India.
33. Julia Eckert, Death and the Nation: State Killing in India, in THE CULTURAL LIVES OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 195, 196-7 (Austin Sarat & Christian Boulanger eds., 2005).
34. David T. Johnson, The Death Penalty in India, in CRIME AND JUSTICE IN INDIA 365, 371-72 (N.
Prabha Unnithan ed., 2013).
35. Indian Penal Code Act No. 45 of 1860, §§ 109, 120B(1), 121, 132, 194, 302, 303, 305, 307, 364A,
and 396, PEN. CODE(1860).
36. Army Act, 1950, No. 46, Acts of Parliament, 1950 §§ 34, 37, 38, 66 (India); Air Force Act, 1950, No.
45, Acts of Parliament, 1950 § 34, 37, 38, 68 (India); Navy Act, 1957, No. 62, Acts of Parliament, 1957 §§ 34,
35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 43, 44, 49, 56, 59, 76 (India). The death penalty is also available for prescribed offenses
under the Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force Act, 1992, No. 35, Acts of Parliament, 1992 (India); Commission
of Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987, No. 3, Acts of Parliament, 1988 (India); Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances (Prevention) Act, 1985, No. 61, Acts of Parliament, 1985, as amended 1988 (India); Terrorist and
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act,1987, No. 28, Acts of Parliament, 1987 (India); Prevention of Terrorism
Act, 2002, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2002 (India); Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989, No. 33, Acts of Parliament, 1989 (India); Explosive Substances Act, 1908, No. 6, Acts of
the Imperial Legislative Council, 1908 (India); and Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967, No. 37, Acts of
Parliament, 1967, as amended 2004. See, Bikramjeet Batra, A Knotty Tale: Understanding the Death Penalty in
India, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A HAZARD TO A SUSTAINABLE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM? 214 n.6 (Lill
Scherdin ed., 2014). Sati refers to the ancient Hindu practice of burning or burying a widow.
37. JOHNSON & ZIMRING, supra note 32, at 438.
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38

convicted of the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament. Prior to this, the most
recent execution was of Dhananjoy Chatterjee in 2004, the only execution
39
between 1997 and Kasab’s in 2012 in a country where 30,000 murders take
40
place per year.
The Indian Penal Code of 1860 was drafted in tandem with the widespread
criminal justice reform then taking place in England, including revision of the
notorious Bloody Code, and the replacement of punishments of the body and
41
transportation to a penal colony with imprisonment. Having benefited from this
reform, India and Bangladesh (as part of a unified British India) inherited a
capital sentencing regime that allowed a judge to consider the circumstances of a
crime and select a death sentence or a sentence of life imprisonment, though
42
death was the rule and life imprisonment the exception. This system was revised
in 1898 to require a judge to articulate why a sentence of life imprisonment was
43
chosen, if it was. The revision of the Criminal Procedure Code in 1973 reversed
this presumption, requiring a judge to provide “special reasons” for selecting a
44
death sentence. However, in limited situations, the mandatory death penalty
survived. India and Bangladesh, both of which operated under the Indian Penal
Code of 1860, inherited a mandatory death sentence for life-term prisoners who
committed murder while incarcerated, a provision originally intended to deter
45
attacks on corrections officials (typically Englishmen) in the colonial period.
46
For this crime, no lesser sentence of imprisonment was possible. As India’s
independence in 1947 predated the European Convention on Human Rights,
which applied to Britain’s colonies upon its entry into force in September 1953
and formed the template for the drafting of a number of independence
constitutions, India’s Constitution lacked both a specific prohibition on cruel,

38. Amit Bindal & C. Raj Kumar, Abolition of the Death Penalty in India: Legal, Constitutional, and
Human Rights Dimensions, in CONFRONTING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN ASIA: HUMAN RIGHTS, POLITICS, AND
PUBLIC OPINION 135-36 (Roger Hood & Surya Deva eds., 2013).
39. See, Batra, supra note 36, at 213.
40. Id.; see also JOHNSON & ZIMRING, supra note 32, at 438.
41. PETER KING, CRIME, JUSTICE, AND DISCRETION IN ENGLAND, 1740-1820, at 263 (2000); David Skuy,
Macaulay and the Indian Penal Code of 1862: The Myth of the Inherent Superiority and Modernity of the
English Legal System Compared to the Indian Legal System in the Nineteenth Century, 32 MOD. ASIAN STUD.
513, 527-30 (1998).
42. Indian Penal Code Act, No 45 of 1860, PEN. CODE (1860).
43. Code of Criminal Procedure Act, No. 5 of 1898 § 367(5) CODE CRIM. PROC. (1898) (India).
44. Code of Criminal Procedure Act, No. 2 of 1973 § 354(3) CODE CRIM. PROC. (1974) (India). This
provision states: “When the conviction is for an offence punishable with death or, in the alternative, with
imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of years, the judgment shall state the reasons for the sentence
awarded, and, in the case of sentence of death, the special reasons for such a sentence.” Id.
45. Indian Penal Code Act of 1860 §303.
46. Id.
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inhuman, and degrading punishment and a clause upholding the due process of
47
law, including the right to a fair trial.
Although the Constitution of India does not precisely fit the Commonwealth
template, its evolution has accorded with the global trend toward restricting the
48
death penalty to the most serious crimes. According to Article 21 of the
Constitution of India: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty
49
except according to procedure established by law.” As Bindal and Kumar write,
the drafters of the Indian Constitution were acutely aware of the interpretive
difficulties of the “due process of law” in the American constitutional context,
and chose a minimalist formulation after extensive debates in the Constituent
50
Assembly. According to the Indian Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union
of India, the procedure prescribed by law under Article 21 had to be “fair, just,
and reasonable, not fanciful, oppressive or arbitrary,” which imported due
process principles into the Indian constitution despite the absence of a specific
51
clause as such. A later case, Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, found that a
fair, just, and reasonable procedure precluded cruel and degrading punishment,
again aligning India with an emerging norm of international law even absent an
52
explicit constitutional provision.
In line with Maneka Gandhi, the Indian Supreme Court has held that public
executions are unconstitutional, as they are not reasonable as to procedure and
53
substance, though the Court has upheld hanging as a method of execution. The
Indian Supreme Court has recognized the “death row syndrome,” referring to the
mental anguish and suffering caused by undue delay in the execution of a death
sentence, and has commuted a number of death sentences where the executive
delayed in the disposal of mercy or clemency petitions. In 1983, the Court ruled
that where a prisoner had been under sentence of death for eight years, the delay
54
in executing the death sentence was unconstitutionally inhuman and degrading.

47. On the impact of the European Convention of Human Rights in the colonies, see JENNIFER A
WIDNER, BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW: FRANCIS NYALALI AND THE ROAD TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN
AFRICA 161 (2001).
48. See ICCPR, supra note 17, at art. 6(2), (restricting death penalty to the “most serious crimes”).
49. INDIA CONST. art. 21.
50. Bindal & Kumar, supra note 38, at 125.
51. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 S.C.R. 621, 658 [21].
52. Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, (1980) 2 S.C.R. 577, 584 (1979) (India).
53. Attorney General v. Devi, (1986) S.C. 467 (1985) (India) (on public executions); Deena v. Union of
India, (1984) S.C.R. 1 (1983) (India) (on the method of execution).
54. Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1983) 2 S.C.R. 348 (India). The Court walked the decision
back slightly in Sher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 S.C.R. 582 (India), in which it overruled Vatheeswaran
to the extent that the former decision set a strict two-year deadline and found the cause of the delay (even when
it was the fault of the prisoner) irrelevant. Sher Singh requires that the Court consider the totality of the
circumstances, including the frivolousness of appeals. Id. The seminal case on the death row phenomenon in
India is Triveniben v. State of Gujarat, (1989) S.C.R. 509, which holds that the Court may consider the cause of
extensive delay after a sentence was finally confirmed by the judicial process in order to determine whether the
case warrants a commutation.
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Although the Court has resisted imposing a strict time limit and closely parsed
the reasons for the delay to ensure that the delay was not solely the fault of the
prisoner, the Court’s decisions on the death row phenomenon align with an
overwhelming international consensus that undue delay orconditions of death
row can render an otherwise constitutional sentence cruel, inhuman, or
55
degrading. This holding has been accepted internationally by the United Nations
Human Rights Committee, the European Court of Human Rights, the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, and the highest courts of Canada, Uganda, and
56
Zimbabwe, and at least two justices of the United States Supreme Court.
Similarly, the Court has also determined that the process of clemency is
subject to judicial review, finding that a grant of mercy or pardon may not be
57
arbitrary or discriminatory under Article 21 and Maneka Gandhi. Executive
clemency is provided for in Article 72(1) of the Constitution of India, which
58
protects the right of all convicted criminals to submit mercy petitions. In India,
the mercy process is more bureaucratic than in other Commonwealth countries,
where an executive has broad discretion. Mercy petitions are first examined by
the Ministry of Home Affairs, where the Minister makes recommendations on the
mercy petitions and sends them to the President. “The President must either
accept the recommendation or return the file once for reconsideration. If the file
resent with the same recommendation, the President must approve the
59
decision . . . .” Perhaps because of this limitation on executive power, several of
India’s presidents have left mercy petitions pending when they questioned the
safety of the verdict, leading to considerable delays that eventually resulted in the
Supreme Court’s commutation of the death sentences. For instance, in February
2014, the Supreme Court commuted the death sentences of the assassins of

55. Some inconsistency in the Court’s decisions is evident. Dhanajoy Chatterjee, for instance, was
executed in 2004 after spending 10 years on death row and 14 years in prison, with much of the delay the fault
of state authorities. See Dhanajoy Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal, (2004) 1 S.C.R. 37 (India). Bikramjeet
Batra outlines a number of cases in which the Court appears to inconsistently apply Triveniben in death row
“syndrome” or “phenomenon” challenges. Bikramjeet Batra, Don’t Be Cruel: The ‘Death Row Phenomenon’
and India’s ‘Delay’ Jurisprudence, in CONFRONTING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN ASIA: HUMAN RIGHTS,
POLITICS, AND PUBLIC OPINION 287, 301-3 (Roger Hood & Surya Deva eds., 2013).
56. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439 (1989) (establishing undue delay as cruel inhuman
and degrading in the European Court of Human Rights); Catholic Comm’r for Justice & Peace in Zim. v. Att’y
Gen. of Zim., (1993) 2 L.R.C. 277 (establishing undue delay as cruel inhuman and degrading in Zimbabwe);
U.S. v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (Can.) (establishing the death row phenomenon as a factor when considering
extradition to a country that practices capital punishment in Canada); Pratt and Morgan v. Att’y Gen., [1993]
U.K.P.C. 1 (Jam.). For the more conservative jurisprudence of the U.N. Human Rights Committee, see, e.g.,
Communication No. 271/1988, Barrett and Sutcliffe v. Jamaica, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/44/D/271/1988 (1992). See also Batra, supra note 36, at 291-7. In the United States, death
penalty appeals based on delay are known as Lackey claims after Lackey v. Texas. See Lackey v. Texas, 514
U.S. 1045, 1045-46 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting to denial of certiorari); see also, Elledgee v. Florida, 525
U.S. 944, 944-946 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting to the denial of certiorari).
57. Maru Ram v. Union of India, (1981) 1 S.C.R. 1196, 1240 (1980).
58. INDIA CONST., art. 72(1).
59. Batra, supra note 36, at 221.
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former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, as eleven years had lapsed on their mercy
60
petitions. In Maru Ram v. Union of India, the Supreme Court ruled that a grant
of mercy or pardon that was “wholly irrelevant, irrational, discriminatory or mala
61
fide” was unconstitutional. In a subsequent case, Kehar Singh v. Union of India,
the Court made clear that only the decision-making process and not the ultimate
62
grant or denial of clemency was justiciable. Nonetheless, opening the clemency
process to judicial review helps prevent arbitrariness in executive decisionmaking and accords with a growing trend in the Commonwealth toward
63
subjecting mercy petitions to judicial oversight.
In 1973, the Supreme Court broadly upheld the death penalty as
constitutional in the case of Jagmohan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, a decision
that sought to avoid the backlash triggered in the United States by the suspension
64
of the death penalty in Furman v. Georgia a year earlier. However, the Court
came breathtakingly close to abolishing the death penalty in Rajenda Prasad v.
State of Uttar Pradesh in 1979, only permitting the death penalty to be imposed
65
where the accused literally “poses a grave peril to societal survival.” Despite
this sweeping holding, however, the Court walked its jurisprudence back to
equilibrium in the seminal case on the constitutionality of the death penalty in
India. In Bachan Singh v State of Punjab, in 1980, the Court crystallized what
became known as the “rarest of the rare” doctrine, restricting the death penalty to
66
only the most heinous crimes. Although the Court upheld the death penalty per
se as constitutional under Article 21, it required the presence of aggravating
circumstances in order to merit the special punishment of death. Bachan Singh
also included a strongly articulated dissent by Justice P.N. Bhagwati, who argued
that the death penalty violated the Constitution. The arbitrariness of judicial
capital discretion, Justice Bhagwati wrote, violated the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection under Article 14, and any deterrent rationale underlying the
67
punishment did not justify the cruelty of a delayed execution.
Three years later, in Macchi Singh v. State of Punjab, the Court defined the
aggravating and mitigating factors that were to be weighed by the sentencing
judge, determining that a death sentence was only appropriate where the
circumstances were unusually heinous such that a sentence of life imprisonment
60. Sriharan v. Union of India, (2014) 4 S.C.C. 242.
61. Maru Ram, (1981) 1 S.C.R. at 1248.
62. Kehar Singh v. Union of India, (1989) 3 S.C.R. 1102, 1103.
63. See, e.g., Lewis v. Att’y Gen. of Jam., [2000] 3 W.L.R. 1785, 1805-6 (Jam.)(finding that a prisoner
had the right to make representations to a mercy committee, to see all material considered by the committee,
and even to have an oral hearing).
64. Jagmohan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1973) 2 S.C.R. 541 (1972)(India); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972).
65. Rajenda Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1979) 3 S.C.R. 78, 112 (India).
66. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 S.C.C. 684 (India).
67. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 1 S.C.R. 145, 256-371 (1982) (India) (Bhagwati, J.,
dissenting). Note that the dissent was published much later than the majority opinion.
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was inadequate. According to the Court in Macchi Singh, the death penalty was
only appropriate in narrow circumstances: when the murder was “extremely
brutal, grotesque, diabolical, revolting, or dastardly”; when it was committed for
a motive that evinced “total depravity and meanness”; when the victim was a
minority, an innocent child, or a member of a scheduled caste; and when the
crime consisted of bride-burning, dowry death, or a multiple, large scale, or
69
politically-motivated murder.
Undoubtedly, the regime established by Bachan Singh succeeded in
restricting executions in India to a trickle. As noted, this low rate of executions
came at a cost, however, as the death penalty became so rare that death sentences
70
and executions followed no discernible pattern. A number of times, lower courts
simply cut and pasted the entirety of the legal analysis weighing aggravating and
71
mitigating factors from other cases, and came to a rote conclusion. Bindal and
Kumar write that “it is the personal philosophy of the judges rather than any
72
sound policy that governs judicial discretion in this area.” They describe how
the Supreme Court refused to consider among the “rarest of the rare,” a brutal
murder for greed, in which an accused misused a position of trust, but found as
among the “rarest of the rare” a multiple murder committed for superstitious
73
reasons. Deva goes even further. Looking at every death sentence reviewed by
the Supreme Court between January 2000 and October 2011, he documents wild
inconsistencies in the Court’s reasoning as to what cases constituted the “rarest of
the rare.” For instance, the Court showed gender insensitivity by consistently
failing to uphold the death penalty for murders involving the rape of a woman or
girl, while coming to markedly different conclusions as to the superstitious
74
sacrifice of children or honor killings. Deva attributes the problem to the
amorphous nature of the guidelines formulated in Bachan Singh and Macchi
Singh, and the lack of any normative basis for weighing aggravating and
75
mitigating factors.
In 2009, the Supreme Court attempted another paradigm shift, introducing a
76
narrower and more concrete test in Santosh Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra. In

68. Macchi Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 3 S.C.R. 413(India).
69. As summarized in A.G. NOORANI, CHALLENGES TO CIVIL RIGHTS GUARANTEES IN INDIA 122-3
(2012).
70. Eckert, supra note 33, at 196.
71. NOORANI, supra note 69, at 123.
72. Bindal & Kumar, supra note 38, at 129.
73. Id., citing Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka, (1983) 2 S.C.R. 552 (India) (appellant was domestic
servant who murdered homeowner and robbed house); Sushil Murmu v. State of Jharkhand, A.I.R. 2004 S.C.
394 (India) (appellant beheaded 9 year old boy in order to purportedly appease deity).
74. Surya Deva, Death Penalty in the ‘Rarest of the Rare’ Cases: A Critique of Judicial Choice-Making,
in CONFRONTING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN ASIA: HUMAN RIGHTS, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC OPINION 252-5
(Roger Hood & Surya Deva eds., 2013).
75. Id. at 252
76. Santosh Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 S.C.C. 498 (India).
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this case, the Court determined that the prosecution was required to prove by
leading evidence that there was no possibility of rehabilitation of the accused and
that life imprisonment would serve no purpose, in order to justify imposition of
77
the death penalty. The Supreme Court followed Bariyar with Rajesh Kumar v.
State of Delhi in 2012, emphasizing the reformatory potential of the criminal
rather than the brutality of the crime in determining whether a murder was among
the “rarest of the rare,” reversing a death sentence even where the murder itself
78
was brutal. The regime created by Bariyar and Rajesh Kumar requires evidence
of the socioeconomic background of the accused and not simply evidence of the
79
crime, with the burden of non-reformation of the accused on the state. Noorani
predicted that the Court would walk back from the abolitionist sentiment
80
expressed in Bariyar, a prediction that seems likely to come true. Indeed, the
most recent cases from the Supreme Court suggest that it has not consistently
81
followed the true spirit of Bariyar and Rajesh Kumar.
III. THE ABOLITION OF THE MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY IN INDIA
With the Supreme Court’s adoption of the “rarest of the rare” doctrine, the
Court abolished the mandatory death penalty in Mithu v State of Punjab in 1983,
a challenge to Section 303 of the Indian Penal Code, which authorized a
mandatory death sentence for a life-term prisoner who committed murder while
incarcerated. In Mithu, the Court found that a mandatory sentence of death was
not a just and reasonable procedure under Article 21, as interpreted by Maneka
82
Gandhi and Sunil Batra. Calling the mandatory death penalty “harsh, unjust,
and unfair,” Chief Justice Yeshwant Vishnu Chandrachud memorably wrote:
The legislature cannot make relevant circumstances irrelevant, deprive
the courts of their legitimate jurisdiction to exercise their discretion not
to impose the death sentence in appropriate cases, compel them to shut
their eyes to mitigating circumstances and inflict upon them the dubious
83
and unconscionable duty of imposing a pre-ordained sentence of death.
In addition, because India’s revised Criminal Procedure Code required
judges to articulate the “special circumstances” meriting a heightened penalty of
death, a mandatory death sentence made compliance with this provision

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Rajesh Kumar v. State of Delhi, Crim. App. Nos. 1871-2 of 2011 (Sept 28, 2011) (India S.C.).
NOORANI, supra note 69, at 125.
Id. at 132.
See Bindal & Kumar, supra note 38 at 132-33.
Mithu v. State of Punjab (1983) 2 S.C.R. 690, 697-98 (India).
Id. at 692.
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impossible, as the sentence was automatic. According to the Court, this
aggravated the arbitrariness of the statute by depriving a life-term offender of a
85
procedural safeguard provided to all other capital defendants. The mere fact that
a person was under a life sentence did not minimize the importance of other
mitigating factors that were relevant at sentencing, such as age, provocation,
86
emotional disturbance, or minimal participation in a prison riot.
The Court also found that Section 303 violated the guarantee of equality
under Article 14 of the Constitution, as no rational justification existed for
87
treating murder by life-term prisoners differently from all other murders. The
Indian Penal Code authorized life imprisonment for crimes such as forgery and
counterfeiting, which have no bearing on a life-term prisoner’s culpability for
88
homicide. The Court noted that there “might have been the semblance of some
logic” if the provision were limited to repeat murderers, such that the intention of
89
the legislature was to provide for an enhanced sentence for the second murder.
This was not the case with Section 303. A concurrence by Justice O. Chinnappa
Reddy memorably noted that Section 303 removed the scales of justice from the
hands of the judge. He wrote: “So final, so irrevocable and so irrestitutable is the
sentence of death that no law which provides for it without involvement of the
90
judicial mind can be said to be fair, just, and reasonable.” According to Justice
Reddy, Bachan Singh upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty in India in
part on the existence of an alternative sanction of life imprisonment as the
91
presumptive punishment for murder. However, in the years following Mithu, the
Indian Parliament passed several new mandatory death statutes, on the theory
that these narrow, specific-intent crimes required aggravating circumstances and
92
involved a limited range of culpability vis-à-vis murder. The most recent
challenges to the mandatory death penalty in India focused on these specificintent crimes.
IV. THE DEATH PENALTY AND SOCIETY IN BANGLADESH
Unlike the Constitution of India, the more recent 1972 Constitution of
Bangladesh contained both a prohibition on cruel, inhuman, and degrading

84. Id. at.708.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 702.
87. Id. at 711.
88. Mithu, 2 S.C.R. at 708-09 (citing Indian Pen. Code Act, 1860, No. 45, §§ 232, 467).
89. Id. at 708.
90. Id. at 713.
91. Id.
92. See Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, No. 65, Acts of Parliament, 1985 (India);
Arms Act, 1959, No. 54, as amended by Arms (Amendment) Act, 1988, No. 42, Acts of Parliament, 1988
(India); Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Acts of Parliament, 1989.
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treatment, and a clause providing for the due process of law. Bangladesh has a
more robust modern history of capital punishment than India, having carried out
about five known executions per year between 2005 and 2010, though statistics
94
are not publicly released and executions are secret. As of 2010, about 90
prisoners were on death row at one facility outside the capital of Dhaka, and
95
roughly 100 to 200 death sentences were handed down each year. Bangladesh
has come in for criticism for its poor juvenile justice system, including the
possibility that a death sentence could be imposed on a child under the age of
96
16. The Government of Bangladesh states that the death penalty is an
“exemplary punishment for heinous crimes such as the throwing of acid, acts of
terrorism, planned murder, trafficking of drugs, rape, [and] abduction of women
97
and children.” Although Bangladesh has a relatively new National Human
Rights Commission, which began operation in December 2008, the Commission
has not strayed from the official government position on the death penalty,
failing to protest several high-profile death sentences for those sentenced to
98
heinous crimes committed during the 1971 war for independence from Pakistan.
Bangladesh authorizes the death penalty for a similar list of crimes as India,
as descended from the 1860 Penal Code: waging war, abetting mutiny, false
testimony in a capital case, murder, assisting suicide of a child or insane person,
99
aggravated kidnapping of a child, and armed robbery resulting in murder. In
addition, other legislation provides death sentences for sabotage, dealing on the
black market, counterfeiting, smuggling, poisoning of consumables, a variety of
100
firearms- and explosives-related offenses, and terrorism-related crimes. The
Women and Children Repression Prevention Act of 2000 and the Acid Crime
Control Act of 2002, likewise punish as capital crimes a variety of gender-based
crimes, such as sexual assault resulting in death, trafficking of women and
101
children, or injuring or maiming with acid. Currently, the death penalty is only

93. BANGL. CONST., arts. 32, 35(5).
94. INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (FIDH), BANGLADESH: CRIMINAL JUSTICE
THROUGH THE PRISON OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM 14 (2010).
95. Id. at 13-14.
96. Y.S.R. Murthy, The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in Abolishing Capital Punishment: A
Critical Evaluation, in CONFRONTING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN ASIA: HUMAN RIGHTS, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC
OPINION 84 (Roger Hood & Surya Deva eds., 2013).
97. Id. at 84 (citing United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the
Universal Periodic Review: Bangladesh, Addendum, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/18/Add.1, 9 June 2009, 4,
Recommendation 19).
98. Id. at 84-85.
99. Bangl. Pen. Code Act, No. 45 of 1860, §§ 121, 132, 194, 302, 305, 396, PEN. CODE (1860).
100. Special Powers Act, 1974, No. 14, 1974, §§ 15, 25, 25A, 25B, 25C, 25D (Bangl.); Arms Act, 1878,
No. 11, Acts of the Imperial Legislative Council, 1871, § 20A (Bangl.); Explosives Act, 1884, No. 4, Acts of
the Imperial Legislative Council, 1884 § 12 (Bangl.); Explosive Substances Act, 1908, No. 6, Acts of the
Imperial Legislative Council, 1908 § 3 (Bangl.).
101. Women and Children Repression Prevention Act, No. 8 (2000), §§ 4, 4(2)(ka), 5, 6, 8, 9(2),
11(Bangl.); Acid Crime Control Act, 2002,No. 1, 2000 § 4, 5(ka) (Bangl.).
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mandatory for three crimes: murder by a life-term prisoner (Section 303 of the
Penal Code, the same provision at issue in Mithu), attempted murder by a lifeterm prisoner (Section 307 of the Penal Code), and dowry murder under the
102
Women and Children Repression Prevention Act. This latter act repealed the
Oppression of Women and Children (Special Enactment) Act of 1995, which
authorized the mandatory death penalty for murder to extort a higher dowry,
murder of a woman or child by explosives, acid, or poison, and murder following
103
rape. As explained below, however, the repeal of this provision was not
retroactive and some prisoners remained under mandatory death sentences for
these crimes.
The death penalty in Bangladesh is deeply troubled. In September 2013, riots
broke out when the Bangladesh Appellate Division handed down a death
sentence to Abdul Quader Molla of the opposition Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami,
104
for crimes committed during the war of independence from Pakistan in 1971.
Molla had been convicted of crimes against humanity and war crimes in February
2013 and given a life sentence by the International Crimes Tribunal, but due to
public pressure, the legislation was subsequently amended to provide for the
105
death sentence in his case. Although human rights organizations condemned
the Appellate Division’s imposition of the death sentence, Molla was executed in
106
December 2013. Other controversial convictions have followed. In October
2013, former Member of Parliament, Salahuddin Quader Chowdhury, was
sentenced to death by the International Crimes Tribunal for crimes committed
107
during the war of independence. In January 2014, a trial court handed down a
death sentence in abstentia to an Islamic militant leader for large-scale arms
108
trafficking. As in India, Bangladesh reports a high rate of extrajudicial
109
executions, including death in police custody. The country has also faced
criticism for its overly broad terrorism laws, inadequate protections from statesanctioned torture, and the speed with which a prisoner is executed following

102. Bangl. Pen. Code of 1860, §§ 303, 307; Women and Children Repression Prevention Act § 11(ka).
103. Oppression of Women and Children (Special Enactment) Act, No. 18 (1995), §§ 4, 6(2), 10(1)
(Bangl.).
104. Mark Magnier, In Bangladesh, Death Penalty for Islamist Leader Sparks Riots, L.A. TIMES (Sept.
17, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/17/world/la-fg-wn-bangladesh-death-sentence-20130917.
105. Human Rights Watch, Bangladesh: Death Sentence Violates Fair Trial Standards (Sept. 18, 2013),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/18/bangladesh-death-sentence-violates-fair-trial-standards.
106. Opposition Leader Executed for War Crimes in Bangladesh, VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS (Dec. 12,
2013, 2:36 AM), http://www.voanews.com/content/bangladesh-supreme-court-will-not-review-death-penalty/
1808614.html.
107. Bangladesh Must Overturn All Death Sentences, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (Oct. 1, 2013),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/bangladesh-mp-war-crimes-death-penalty-2013-10-01.
108. Bangladesh Court Gives ULFA Chief Death Sentence, BUSINESS STANDARD (Jan. 31, 2014),
http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/bangladesh-court-gives-ulfa-chief-death-sentence114013000489_1.html.
109. FIDH, supra note 94, at 17.
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denial of a clemency petition. Between 1975 and 2008, at least 247 prisoners
111
were hanged in Bangladesh. Currently, at least 1,500 convicted criminals face
112
the death penalty, of whom 950 are in custody and the rest still at large.
In line with the jurisprudence of neighboring India, Bangladesh adheres to its
own version of the “rarest of the rare” doctrine. In Sarder v. State, the Appellate
Division reduced a death sentence based on the “bitter matrimonial relationship”
between the appellants’ family and the deceased, noting that the murder
provision of the Penal Code did “not specify in which case the death sentence
should be given” but rather left “the matter to the discretion of the court” and
required that every case “be considered in the facts and circumstances of that
113
case only.” In a later appeal, where the defendant helped plan but did not
participate in the actual murder, the Court found that “some extenuating
circumstances [have] visibly appeared as would permit us to take a lenient view
in the matter of sentence,” and chose a sentence of life imprisonment over a
114
death sentence. In 2009, the Appellate Division reversed a death sentence for
ordinary murder without premeditation, finding that it was not among “the rarest
of the rare cases,” and the “ends of justice will be met if the sentence of death of
115
accused . . . is converted into one of imprisonment for life.”
In ordinary murder cases, the Appellate Division requires trial courts to
weigh aggravating and mitigating factors and determine whether a death sentence
is appropriate, a similar approach to that of the Indian Supreme Court.
V. HIGH COURT DIVISION OF BANGLADESH: BANGLADESH LEGAL AID AND
SERVICES TRUST (ON BEHALF OF SUKUR ALI) V. BANGLADESH (2010)
Unlike India, Bangladesh maintained the mandatory death sentence for
murder and attempted murder by a life-term prisoner, as well as a mandatory
death penalty under the Oppression of Women and Children (Special Enactment)
Act of 1995, until its repeal in 2000 for three crimes: murder of a woman or child
using explosives, corrosive substances, or poison; dowry murder, in which a
woman was killed by her husband or his family after suffering harassment or
116
torture to extort a higher dowry; and murder following rape. In 1995, Sukur
Ali, a 14-year-old boy, was sentenced to death under this law for the rape and
murder of a 7-year-old girl, a sentence that was upheld by the High Court

110. Id. at 23-24, 27, 34-35.
111. Id. at 26.
112. Id.
113. Sarder v. State, (1987) 7 B.L.D. (A.D.) 324, 328.
114. Abdul Awal v. State, (1998) 18 B.L.D. (H.C.D.) 605, 610.
115. Sarder v. State, (1987) 7 B.L.D. (A.D.) 324, 328; see also State v. Pinto, (2009) 29 B.L.D. (A.D.) 73.
116. Oppression of Women and Children (Special Enactment) Act 18 (1995), §§ 4, 6(2), 10(1); see also
Bangladesh Penal Code, 1860, §§ 303 (murder by life-term prisoner), 307 (attempted murder by life-term
prisoner).
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Division on the basis that “[n]o alternative punishment has been provided for the
offence that the condemned prisoner has been charged and we are left with no
other discretion but to maintain the sentence if we believe that the prosecution
117
has been able to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt.” The High Court
Division refused to defy the language of the statute that provided for the
mandatory death penalty for anyone guilty of the offense, even a juvenile. The
118
decision was later confirmed by the Appellate Division. In an original writ filed
by the Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (BLAST) on behalf of Sukur
Ali, the High Court Division invalidated the mandatory death penalty in March
2010, indicating that the mandatory death penalty was not just struck down for
offenses under the Oppression of Women and Children (Special Enactment) Act,
119
but for offenses under the Bangladesh Penal Code as well.
As an initial matter, the petitioners objected to treating Sukur Ali as an adult
and denying him the more lenient punishment subsequently passed after the
120
repeal of the law under which he was charged. However, the State pointed out
that the revised law was purposefully not retroactive, keeping the harsher
121
sentences of the former law intact. As for the mandatory death sentences still
provided for under the Bangladesh Penal Code, namely murder and attempted
murder by life-term prisoners, the State argued that the offender “committed an
offence over an[d] above the substantive offence for which he had been
122
convicted,” a rejection of the Indian Supreme Court’s reasoning in Mithu. The
State also sought to distinguish Mithu by arguing that in India, the normal
punishment upon conviction for murder is life imprisonment and judges are
required to give special reasons if they choose to impose a death sentence; by
contrast, in Bangladesh, a judge must give reasons for selecting either sentence,
123
which does not operate as a presumption against death. The Court was
unpersuaded. First, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty per
se, but found that a defendant must have the opportunity to put forward
124
mitigating evidence in a sentencing hearing. The Court also expressed concern
about the possibility of wrongful convictions in Bangladesh, but noted that
abolition required public and parliamentary debate, as well as research on
125
alternatives.
117. State v. Sukur Ali, (2004) 9 B.L.C. (H.C.D.) 238, 250.
118. The decision does not appear to be reported, but is referred to a number of times by the High Court
Division. Id. at 3-4. The statute itself defines “child” but does not define any limits on the person of the
offender. See, e.g., Oppression of Women and Children (Special Enactment) Act 18 (1995), §§ 4, 5, 6 (noting
that “whoever” commits the capital crimes shall be punished with death).
119. Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust v. Bangl., (2010) 30 B.L.D. (H.C.D.) 194.
120. Id. at 4, 12.
121. Id. at 14.
122. Id. at 15.
123. Id. at 16 (citing Bangl. Code of Criminal Procedure, § 367(5)).
124. Id. at 20, 31.
125. Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust, 30 B.L.D.. at 33.
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One of the more remarkable aspects of the decision was the extent to which it
considered jurisprudence from other Commonwealth nations on the
constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty in addition to Mithu. The Court
cited to the Privy Council’s decision in Reyes v. Queen (appeal taken from
Belize) for the proposition that a mandatory sentence of death may be too harsh
126
for a crime and consequently cruel, inhuman, and degrading. The Court
carefully noted the slightly different wording of the right to life provisions of the
Bangladeshi and Belizean constitutions, but indicated that Bangladesh was a
party to the ICCPR and the country’s constitution contained a prohibition on
127
cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment. The Court also referenced Roberts
v. Louisiana, the companion case of Woodson v. North Carolina, decided by the
United States Supreme Court in 1976, as well as the Malawian case striking
down the mandatory death penalty in Kafantayeni and the South African decision
128
abolishing capital punishment in Makwanyane.
The Court was also receptive to a separation of powers argument, finding
that a constraint on judicial sentencing discretion unconstitutionally infringed the
129
judicial power. According to the High Court Division, when the legislature
prescribed a mandatory punishment, “the hands of the court are thereby tied” and
the “court becomes a simple rubberstamp [sic] of the legislature” in violation of
the “duty of the court to take into account [an accused’s] character and
130
antecedents in order to come to a just and proper decision.” This rationale
parallels Mithu closely. The Court ensured that its decision was far-reaching by
specifically addressing not only the repealed provision of dowry murder but also
the mandatory sentence of death for life-term prisoners who kill: “any mandatory
provision of law that takes away the discretion of the court and precludes the
court from coming to a decision which is based on the assessment of all the facts
and circumstances surrounding any given offence . . . is not permissible under the
131
Constitution.” Though acknowledging that abolition of the death penalty was a
decision better left to the legislature, the Court declared Section 6(2) of the
Oppression of Women and Children (Special Enactment) Act unconstitutional,
and declared that courts must always have “the discretion to determine what
punishment a transgressor deserves and to fix the appropriate sentence for the
132
crime he is alleged to have committed.” Additionally, the decision’s reasoning

126. Id. at 20-21.
127. Id. at 21, 24.
128. Id. at 10, 28 (citing Stanislaus Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Kafantayeni v. Att’y Gen.,
[2007] MWHC 1; State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.)).
129. Id. at 29.
130. Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust, 30 B.L.D. at 29-30.
131. Id. at 32.
132. Id.
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almost certainly encompassed the mandatory death sentence for prisoners under a
133
sentence of life imprisonment who committed murder.
The High Court Division’s decision in BLAST v. Bangladesh may be
criticized because it did not fully resolve the situation of petitioner Sukur Ali, a
juvenile sentenced to death based on a now-repealed law more than a decade ago.
Instead of reversing his death sentence, the Court hid behind a false guise of
judicial restraint, leaving it to the Appellate Division to overturn the sentence at
134
issue. The Court’s final holding is inconsonant with its reasoning, as it only
issued a stay of execution for two months from the decision despite the troubling
constitutional defects in Sukur Ali’s sentence. Nonetheless, the decision makes
Sukur Ali’s resentencing likely, and the Court’s sweeping holding aligns
Bangladesh with the clear emerging consensus in the Commonwealth that not all
murders are equally heinous and deserving of death, and that a trial judge is best
placed to consider the circumstances of the offense and of the offender in
determining an appropriate sentence.
VI. BOMBAY HIGH COURT: INDIAN HARM REDUCTION NETWORK (ON BEHALF
OF GULAM MOHAMMED MALIK) V. UNION OF INDIA (2011)
In June 2011, the Bombay High Court found the mandatory death penalty,
under Section 31A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act of
1985, unconstitutional in Indian Harm Reduction Network (on behalf of Gulam
Mohammed Malik) v. Union of India, which involved a challenge to one of the
specific intent crimes punishable by an automatic death sentence: repeated large135
scale drug trafficking. In that case, the Court read the mandatory death
provision (“shall be punishable with death”) as discretionary (“may be
punishable with death”) in order to align Section 31A with Article 21 of the
Constitution of India, becoming the first court in the Commonwealth to find a
136
mandatory death penalty for drug trafficking unconstitutional. India’s provision
for an automatic death sentence under the Narcotic and Psychotropic Drugs Act
only applied to repeat drug traffickers, making it narrower than similar legislation
137
in Southeast Asia, such as in Malaysia and Singapore. In addition to the Article

133. See id. at 34.
134. Ridwanul Hoque, Constitutionalism and the Judiciary in Bangladesh, in COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN SOUTH ASIA 303, 325 (Sunil Khilani, Vikram Raghavan & Arun Thiruvengadam eds.,
2013).
135. Indian Harm Reduction Network (on behalf of Gulam Mohammed Malik) v. Union of India, Crim.
Writ Petition No. 1784 of 2010 (11 June 2010) (Bombay H.C.).
136. Id. at 23. The Sri Lanka Court of Appeal had previously read a mandatory death penalty for drug
trafficking as discretionary based on statutory interpretation, but that provision used the word “liable,” i.e.,
“shall be liable” to suffer death rather than “shall” suffer death, which is more ambiguous than the Indian
provision. Van Der Jhultes v. Attorney General, (1989) 1 Sri L.R. 204 (C.A. 1988).
137. In Malaysia and Singapore, the mandatory death penalty applies to drug traffickers for their first
offense, based on a statutory schedule of the quantities of the narcotic being trafficked. See Dangerous Drugs

246

Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 28
21 challenge to the death penalty as a violation of the right to life based on
Mithu, the petitioners also raised an Article 14 equal protection challenge to the
drug thresholds and the “repeat” status of the provision. In essence, the
petitioners argued that the quantity thresholds separating those condemned to
death from those receiving lesser sentences were arbitrary: trafficking in one
kilogram of heroin, for instance, triggered a mandatory death sentence, while
trafficking in 0.99 kilogram would not, even though the culpability was not
138
discernibly greater.
In addition, the petitioners made a second equality argument. They argued
that the requirement that the mandatory death penalty for drug trafficking fall
only on repeat offenders was akin to murder by a life-term prisoner as in Mithu,
where the Supreme Court determined that the fact that the prisoner was already
under a life sentence was not a rational ground for determining that the murder
that he or she committed—to the exclusion of all other murders—was necessarily
139
more deserving of death. The Court rejected both equality arguments. The
judges found that the differentia in the law that assigned culpability based on the
volume of the drug being trafficked was rational. In doing so, the Court followed
the jurisprudence of the Singapore Court of Appeal, which had determined that
small-scale and large-scale drug traffickers were not similarly situated in terms of
140
culpability, and differentiating between them was constitutional. The Court also
rejected the challenge to the “repeat” status of an offender under Section 31A of
the Narcotic Drugs Act, finding that a repeated conviction of an offender was not
141
an arbitrary distinction and bore a nexus to criminal culpability. This is
probably the right result, or at least it avoids the unconstitutional aspect of
Section 303 of the Indian Penal Code at issue in Mithu—which authorized the
Act, 1952, No. 234, § 39B (Malay.); Misuse of Drugs Act, 1973, No. 5, as amended by Misuse of Drugs
(Amendment) Act, 1975, No. 49 (Sing.). In 2012, Singapore enacted a sweeping law reform that removed most
drug trafficking from the scope of the mandatory death penalty. Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Act, 2012, No.
27 (Sing.).
138. Indian Harm Reduction Network, Crim. Writ Petition No. 1784 of 2010 at 65-66. In any event,
creating a discretionary death penalty largely solves this problem, as a judge will have discretion to determine
the culpability of a repeat offender.
139. See Mithu v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 S.C.R. 690, 702-03 (India). According to the Court:
The circumstance that a person is undergoing a sentence of life imprisonment does not minimize the
importance of mitigating factors which are relevant on the question of sentence which should be
imposed for the offence committed by him while he is under the sentence of life imprisonment. Indeed,
a crime committed by a convict within the jail while he is under the sentence of life imprisonment
may, in certain circumstances, demand and deserve greater consideration, understanding and sympathy
than the original offence for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Mithu v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 S.C.R. 690, 702-03 (India). This rationale is virtually identical to that
of the U.S. Supreme Court four years later in Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 81 (1987).
140. Indian Harm Reduction Network, Crim. Writ Petition No. 1784 of 2010 at 69; Yong Vui Kong v.
Public Prosecutor, [2010] 3 S.L.R. 491, 538-39 (Sing. C.A.) (according to the Court in Yong Vui Kong, two
drug traffickers carrying different amounts of drugs were not equal at all; they were, in fact, distinguishable, and
the legislature could assign them different penalties).
141. Indian Harm Reduction Network, Crim. Writ Petition No. 1784 of 2010 at 67-68.
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mandatory death penalty for prisoners who committed murder while already
under a sentence of life imprisonment—namely that the offense underlying the
142
life sentence was irrelevant to the culpability of the subsequent murder. By
contrast, a second offense for large-scale drug trafficking could be relevant to the
143
culpability of the defendant, as suggested by the dicta in Mithu.
Although the Court rejected the petitioner’s Article 14 equal protection
challenges, it followed Mithu closely in determining that Section 31A was
unconstitutional under Article 21, the right to life provision. The Court stated that
Section 31A “completely takes away the judicial discretion, nay, abridges the
entire procedure for administration of criminal justice of weighing the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in which the offence was committed as
144
well as that of the offender.” In accordance with Mithu, the Court found that
judicial discretion in capital sentencing was required for a just and fair procedure
under Article 21, as interpreted in Maneka Gandhi. That Section 31A
distinguished traffickers based on the quantity of drugs being trafficked did not
make less relevant the requirement to weigh aggravating and mitigating
145
circumstances of the offense and of the offender. The Court looked to the body
of comparative jurisprudence on the mandatory death penalty arising from the
United States and the Commonwealth, including Woodson v. North Carolina and
146
similar cases arising out of the Commonwealth Caribbean and East Africa.
More troublingly, the Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that even a
discretionary death penalty per se was disproportionate to drug trafficking
offenses because the crime did not result in death and was thus not among the
147
“rarest of [the] rare.” According to the Court, an offense “relating to [a]
narcotic drug or psychotropic substance is even more heinous than culpable
homicide, because the latter affects only an individual, while the former affects
and leaves its deleterious effect on society, besides crippling the economy of the
148
nation as well.” This uncritical holding is troubling for two reasons. First, the
distinction between an “individual” crime and a “societal” crime is a false one
and subject to some manipulation by the Court. For instance, in dicta, the Court
noted that white collar crime could be a most serious crime, as it is “less

142. According to the Court in Mithu, prescribing a mandatory death sentence for murder for a prisoner
serving a life sentence for forgery, for instance, would be an arbitrary application of the provision because the
fact of the forgery had no nexus to the heightened penalty for murder. Mithu, 2 S.C.R. at 697-98. This is similar
to the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in Sumner v. Shuman, 438 U.S. 66, 81 (1987) (invalidated Nevada’s
mandatory death penalty for life-term prisoners who committed murder while imprisoned. As Justice Blackmun
wrote, without consideration of the nature of the underlying life-term offense, “the label ‘life-term inmate’
reveals little about the inmate’s record or character”).
143. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
144. Indian Harm Reduction Network, Crim. Writ Petition No. 1784 of 2010 at 60.
145. Id. at 61.
146. Id. at 36-37.
147. Id. at 16.
148. Id. at 73.
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shocking than the crime of murder, but [is] more heinous” than murder. Surely,
the distinction between a merely “shocking” crime and a “heinous” crime is not
clear and consistent enough to be of constitutional importance. The Court
manipulated the definition of drug trafficking in a way to presume its
constitutionality.
Second, the Court cavalierly disregarded international human rights norms in
determining that drug trafficking could be a “most serious” crime and therefore
warranted the death penalty in accordance with the International Covenant on
150
Civil and Political Rights. By contrast, the United Nations Human Rights
Committee has determined that drug-related offenses not resulting in death fall
151
outside the scope of “most serious crimes,” under the Covenant. Although the
Court’s holding accorded with similar precedent arising from the Singapore
152
Court of Appeal, Singapore is not a party to the Covenant. This holding is also
out of sync with the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, hardly a
progressive leader on the topic of capital punishment, which has generally held
153
that the death penalty is unconstitutional for crimes not resulting in death. The
death penalty for drug trafficking is deeply problematic because it falls heavily
on drug “mules” at the expense of drug “lords,” and the Indian court’s decision
contradicts a growing international trend away from the death penalty for drug
154
trafficking.
Rather than striking Section 31A completely, as the petitioners argued, the
Court opted to construe the mandatory sentencing provision as discretionary and
replaced “shall” with “may” so that a trial court retained discretion to substitute
155
death or a lesser punishment depending on the circumstances of the case. This
accords with the Court’s holding that a discretionary death penalty for drug

149. Id. at 77-78.
150. Indian Harm Reduction Network, Crim. Writ Petition No. 1784 of 2010 at 77. According to the
Court, “it is [a] well-established position that the International Conventions cannot be the governing law. It is
the Municipal law which ought to prevail.” Id. However, an ambiguous law with two interpretations should be
read in a manner that is consistent with fundamental rights, and particularly the right to life. Elizabeth Wicks,
The Meaning of “Life”: Dignity and the Right to Life in International Human Rights Treaties, 12(2) HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 199, 201 (2012).
151. UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Thailand, ¶ 14, UN Doc. No.
CCPR/CO/84/THA, (July 8, 2005); UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Sudan, ¶ 19, UN
Doc. No. CCPR/C/SDN/CO/3, (Aug. 29, 2007).
152. Singapore is not bound by the Covenant, but considers drug trafficking to be a “most serious crime.”
Michael Hor, The Death Penalty in Singapore and International Law, 8 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 105, 106 (2004).
153. That is, at least non-military crimes. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (invalidating
death penalty for rape). Coker was a plurality decision, but it was confirmed by a majority in Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (invalidating the death penalty for rape of a child under 12).
154. See, e.g., Griffith Edwards et al., Drug Trafficking: Time to Abolish the Death Penalty, in 8 INT’L J.
MENTAL HEALTH ADDICTION 616, 617-18 (2010). Countries such as The Gambia and Nigeria have abolished
the death penalty for drug trafficking in recent years. ANDREW NOVAK, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AFRICA:
FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 76 (2014).
155. Indian Harm Reduction Network, Crim. Writ Petition No. 1784 of 2010 at 79.
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trafficking was not unconstitutional. Despite this strained holding, the Court’s
decision in Gulam Mohammed Malik accords with the regime established in
Mithu, requiring judicial sentencing discretion in every capital case, at least as to
157
the mandatory nature of the death sentence under Section 31A.
VII. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA: DALBIR SINGH V. STATE OF PUNJAB (2012)
In February 2012, the Supreme Court of India invalidated the mandatory
death penalty under the Arms Act, originally passed in 1959 but amended in
1988, to clarify which weapons were prohibited and to sync provisions on
158
possession of prohibited weapons with those on the use of such weapons. The
amendment at Section 27(3) of the Arms Act introduced the mandatory death
penalty for causing death through acquiring, carrying, manufacturing, or selling
prohibited arms of war, another piece of specific-intent legislation that was
159
passed subsequently to Mithu. In this decision, Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab,
the Court cited global precedent for the proposition that the mandatory death
penalty violated the right to a fair trial because it precluded a sentencing hearing
160
for a defendant convicted of murder. By drawing on the transnational corpus of
death penalty jurisprudence, the Indian Supreme Court’s decision contributed to
the harmonization of death penalty regimes across borders and helped integrate
161
international human rights norms in domestic law. Although legislation to
repeal Section 27(3) of the Arms Act had been introduced in Parliament and the
defendant, Dalbir Singh, had been acquitted by the High Court, the Supreme
162
Court nonetheless pronounced on the validity of the mandatory death provision.
According to the Court, the mandatory nature of the death sentence violated
constitutionally-protected judicial review of criminal sentences and undermined
the statutory sentencing structure of the Indian Penal Code and Criminal
163
Procedure Code. The Court relied on Mithu’s holding that Article 21 of the
Constitution required consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors in order
to limit the death sentence only to the most serious or heinous offenses, even for
164
narrowly-defined, specific-intent crimes. According to the Court, the Arms Act
prohibited the “use” of any prohibited weapon that “resulted” in death. As the

156. Id. at 77.
157. See id. at 77.
158. State of Punjab v. Dalbir Singh, A.I.R. 2012 S.C. 1040, [12] (India).
159. The Arms Act, No. 54 of 1959, INDIA CODE (1959), as amended by The Arms (Amendment) Act,
No. 42 of 1988, Acts of Parliament, 1988 (introducing mandatory death sentence).
160. Dalbir Singh, A.I.R. 2012 at [81.5].
161. Id. at [100-01].
162. Id. at [103].
163. Id. at [89, 98].
164. Id. at [89].
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word “use” is undefined in the Act and both words are extremely broad, the
165
prohibition fell afoul of the due process test of Article 21 and Maneka Gandhi.
In addition to reviewing domestic precedent, the Court engaged in a
searching analysis of Woodson v. North Carolina and other American decisions.
The Court also considered the more recent cases from the Privy Council’s
Caribbean jurisprudence and from the highest courts of Kenya, Malawi, and
Uganda, which found the mandatory nature of the death sentence
166
unconstitutional. The Court extensively quoted many of these precedents,
summarizing the grounds on which they were decided. “It is clear from the
discussion hereinabove that mandatory death penalty has been found to be
constitutionally invalid in various jurisdictions where there is an independent
judiciary and the rights of the citizens are protected in a Constitution,” the Court
167
ruled, sensing an emerging global norm.
The Court distinguished the
jurisprudence of Malaysia and Singapore, where courts have upheld the
constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty under constitutions that do not
explicitly prohibit cruel and degrading punishment or provide due process of law
168
protections. By contrast, the Court noted, such provisions became part of
169
Indian constitutional doctrine through Maneka Gandhi and Sunil Batra.
Finding this comparative jurisprudence persuasive, the Court found that the
mandatory death sentence in the Arms Act of 1959, as amended in 1988, violated
both the equality provision at Article 14 and the right to life clause at Article
170
21. If anything, the Court’s review of this foreign case law was wholly
accepting, almost completely uncritical, and it is not clear from the decision
whether the Court merely quoted or actually relied on the rationale of the foreign
decisions, such as that of the Supreme Court of Uganda, which found the
legislative enactment of a mandatory death penalty to constrain judicial
171
discretion and therefore violate the separation of powers.

165. Id. at [88].
166. Dalbir Singh, A.I.R. 2012 at [49-52], [75-76], [80]. See generally also Indian Harm Reduction
Network (on behalf of Gulam Mohammed Malik) v. Union of India, Crim. Writ Petition No. 1784 of 2010 (11
June 2010) (Bombay H.C.).
167. Dalbir Singh, A.I.R. 2012 at [87].
168. In particular, the Court distinguished the Privy Council’s decision in Ong Ah Chuan. See id. at [86].
169. Id. at [88].
170. The Court’s rationale on the equality provision (Article 14) is different from in Gulam Mohammed
Malik or even in Mithu because the Arms Act did not require a classification scheme as such. In Dalbir Singh,
the Court indicates that the mandatory death penalty violates equal protection because it denies due process (in
the form of a sentencing hearing) only to defendants convicted of a mandatory capital crime, unlike all other
capital defendants.
Id. at [101].
171. Id. at [78], quoting Kigula v. A.G., [2009] 2 E.A.L.R. 1 (Uganda S.C.).
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VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE FUTURE OF THE
MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY
The mandatory sentence of death is on the rapid retreat across the
Commonwealth, as it conflicts with the emerging consensus that the death
penalty should be reserved only for the most heinous crimes based on the
172
particular characteristics of the offense and the offender. The experiences of
Commonwealth Caribbean and East African courts have succeeded in building a
corpus of transnational jurisprudence that other Commonwealth courts draw on,
follow, and distinguish. As the recent case law from India and Bangladesh
suggests, Global South nations are not just passive recipients of foreign
jurisprudence from the Global North, but rather active contributors to a
constitutional sharing process, making their own imprint and ensuring that the
decline of the death penalty across the globe is as much based on local criminal
justice cultures and popular demands as on human rights norms of Western
origin. The decisions of Indian and Bangladeshi courts in Dalbir Singh, Gulam
Mohammed Malik, and BLAST/Sukur Ali together stand for the emerging
proposition that the mandatory death penalty violates human rights norms, even
for specific-intent crimes, such as drug trafficking and terrorist offenses, which
possess aggravating factors and are typically premeditated, in contrast to the
173
broad range of culpability of the crime of murder. In this, the decisions provide
a path forward for other common law nations that possess such laws, including
174
Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore. Ultimately, this transnational “sharing”
process of death penalty jurisprudence is helping to install prevailing norms of
constitutional due process and human dignity into domestic constitutional
jurisprudence.
As a doctrinal matter, the reasoning of these courts is clear that the
mandatory sentence for death, no matter how narrowly-defined the crime or the
mental state therein, always violates the right to life provisions of the Indian and
Bangladeshi constitutions. With the invalidation of the mandatory death penalty
under Section 303 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 27(3) of the Arms Act, and
Section 31A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act of 1985, the
law is now settled that a mandatory death sentence is never constitutionally
175
permissible under the Constitution of India. The Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act of 1989 still has the mandatory
death penalty, but only for an extremely narrow class of crime that is virtually
never prosecuted: false witness or fabrication of evidence that results in the

172.
173.
174.
175.
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execution of an innocent person. According to Batra, some prisoners may still
be under a mandatory sentence of death in India for a law that has lapsed, the
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act of 1985, and may need to
177
bring original writs challenging their individual sentences. Sukur Ali’s case
also raises the troubling possibility that other prisoners may be under a
mandatory sentence of death under now-repealed laws in Bangladesh.
Nonetheless, the erosion of the mandatory death penalty in the common law
world is a case study on the mutually reinforcing relationship between
international human rights law and domestic constitutional law. The prohibition
on cruel and degrading punishment in international law resulted from a
prevailing consensus in domestic constitutional systems. In turn, human rights
litigation in the Caribbean, Africa, and South and Southeast Asia relied on the
persuasive authority of international law in bringing challenges in domestic
systems, including in India and Bangladesh, both parties to the ICCPR and other
178
human rights instruments.
The weight of this comparative domestic
jurisprudence is in turn establishing a new norm of international human rights
that punishment disproportionate to a crime constitutes cruel, inhuman, and
degrading punishment, including an automatic death sentence upon conviction
without regard to the circumstances of the offense or the offender. Even more
remarkably, this human rights litigation was sponsored by a core group of
transnational human rights lawyers with the specific agenda of narrowing the
scope of capital punishment with a view to its total abolition, showing how a
small group of lawyers can achieve significant criminal justice reform by relying
on relatively uniform constitutional vulnerabilities in post-colonial common law
179
constitutions.

176. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, No. 33 of 1989, INDIA CODE
(1989), § 2(i).
177. See BIKRAM JEET BATRA, LETHAL LOTTERY: THE DEATH PENALTY IN INDIA: A STUDY OF SUPREME
COURT JUDGMENTS IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, 1950-2006, 44 (2008).
178. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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